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Abstract: In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some 
fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a 
definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account 
for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer 
to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a 
tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: ‘descriptive 
accuracy’ (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), 
and ‘moral import’ (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with 
lying), vindicating the primacy of the former desideratum. 
Regarding (ii), it shows that Krauss’ proposed ‘worse-off 
requirement’ meets neither of these desiderata, whereas the 
‘comparative insincerity condition’ (Marsili 2014) can meet both. 
The conclusion is that lies are assertions that the speaker takes to 
be more likely to be false than true, and their distinctive 
blameworthiness is a function of the extent to which they violate a 
sincerity norm. 
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Introduction: Insincerity and Graded Beliefs 
In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, scholars 
agree that the following are necessary conditions for lying: 
A. The speaker asserts that p 
B. The speaker believes that p is false 
Recently, Marsili (2014, 2018) and Krauss (2017) have challenged 
this orthodoxy. They both contend that the ‘belief requirement’ (B)  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is off track, because it is unable to capture graded-belief lies : lies 1
involving a graded belief, i.e. a proposition that the speaker neither 
fully believes to be true, nor fully believes to be false. For example, 
suppose that Kermit has a credence of 0.25 in (1), so that he 
believes that it is probably false that there are chocolate cookies in 
the jar:  
(1)There are chocolate cookies in the jar 
If Kermit tells his friend Elmo that (1), Kermit is lying. But the 
‘belief requirement’ (B) prevents the standard definition from 
counting (1) as a lie, because Kermit does not fully believe (1) to be 
false – he merely believes (1) to be more likely to be false than true. 
Marsili and Krauss agree that (B) needs to be revised to capture 
graded-belief lies like (1). Marsili’s (2014:162, 2018:176) proposal is 
to expand (B) into the ‘comparative insincerity condition’, so as to 
capture any credence perceivably lower than 0.5: 
The comparative insincerity condition 
(CIC) The speaker takes herself to be more confident in the 
falsity of p than in its truth 
CIC is able to capture graded-belief lies like (1). Nonetheless, Krauss 
(2017) has recently alleged that CIC is mistaken, because it fails to 
‘account for the damage lying does’. His alternative proposal is that 
an assertion is a lie only if it is expected to make the addressee 
‘epistemically worse-off’; that is, only if it satisfies the ‘worse-off 
requirement’: 
The worse-off requirement 
(W-O) The expected epistemic damage to the audience, with 
respect to p, by the speaker’s lights, conditional on the 
audience trusting her with respect to p, at all, is greater 
than 0 
 For Marsili (2016), however, there is a further reason to reject (B), namely that it 1
fails to capture some insincere promises: those that you believe you will likely keep, 
despite your intention to violate them.
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In simpler words, in asserting that p you lie only if you expect your 
audience’s credence in p to become more inaccurate than the one 
they previously held (if they trust your assertion that p). Applied to 
our example, this means that (1) is a lie whenever Kermit asserts (1) 
and expects Elmo to update his credence in p to a value that is more 
distant from 0.25 (which is Kermit’s standard of accuracy) than 
Elmo’s current credence in p. For instance, Kermit is lying if he 
expects Elmo to revise his credence in (1) from 0.4 to 1, because 1 is 
further away from 0.25 than 0.4.  
Krauss prefers W-O to CIC for one crucial reason: he takes the 
former, but not the latter, to be able to account for the ‘distinctive 
blameworthiness’ of lying. He shows this by means of a 
counterexample: 
Imagine a case in which the speaker is just slightly more confident that p 
is true than false – say she has 0.51 credence in p. And, further, imagine 
that the speaker knows that her audience is agnostic – that the audience 
has 0.5 credence in the proposition. […] Imagine that the audience moves 
from 0.5 credence to 0.8 credence. If the speaker’s credence is 0.51, then 
the speaker will expect the audience to suffer epistemic damage. If the 
blameworthiness for lying is grounded in expected epistemic damage, 
then this speaker is blameworthy in exactly the same way as liars are, 
even if, according to both the orthodox position and Marsili’s proposal, 
she hasn’t lied. 
The effectiveness of this counterexample is conditional on two 
assumptions: (i) that the primary desideratum of a definition of lying 
is to track the distinctive blameworthiness of lying, and (ii) that this 
blameworthiness is best characterised in terms of expected epistemic 
damage, as defined by the worse-off requirement. These assumptions 
are not uncontroversial, as they take a firm stance on two 
fundamental issues in the philosophy of lying: what the primary 
desiderata of a definition of lying are (for assumption (i)), and what 
makes lying blameworthy (for assumption (ii)). If these assumptions 
are correct, the ones underlying the current philosophical debate on 
lying must be wrong, as both (i) and (ii) are overwhelmingly held to 
be false. In this paper, I vindicate a ‘traditional’ stance on these 
issues, and show that, at closer inspection, both assumptions are 
indeed wrong. Against assumption (i), I argue that capturing the 
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distinctive blameworthiness of lying cannot be the only desideratum 
of a definition of lying. Against assumption (ii), I show that the 
worse-off requirement (W-O) fails to track the distinctive 
blameworthiness of lying, which is better characterised in terms of 
the violation of a sincerity norm.  
1. The Desiderata of a Definition of Lying 
I will start by dealing with the first assumption: that the primary 
desideratum of a definition of lying is to track the distinctive 
blameworthiness of lying. To avoid misunderstandings, let me stress 
that this assumption should not be confused with the view that all 
lies are, all things considered, morally wrong.  Krauss is merely 
assuming that a good definition should track the fact that lies are 
blameworthy in the same distinctive way (e.g. in virtue of the 
epistemic risk that they impose on the audience). This still allows for 
single acts of lying to be ‘all things considered’ permissible, whenever 
sufficient countervailing considerations apply (Margolis 1963).  
The idea that a definition should track the distinctive 
blameworthiness of lying is not entirely new. Some authors before 
Krauss have assumed that a negative moral evaluation is part of the 
meaning of the word ‘lie’ (Margolis 1963, cf. also Williams 1985, 
140), so that in defining lying one should also explain what makes 
lying blameworthy (Grotius 1625,  book III.I.XI.1) . This is 2
nonetheless a minority view, and in contemporary scholarship the 
prevailing assumption is that the key desideratum of a definition of 
lying is its ‘descriptive accuracy’: a good definition should match our 
(morally neutral) intuitions about particular cases, capturing all and 
only those utterances that we call lies. The task of defining what a 
lie is and explaining why (ceteris paribus) lying is wrong are on this 
conception two separate tasks (Kemp and Sullivan 1993, Fallis 2009, 
Carson 2010:13, Mahon 2015). In assuming that a definition should 
first of all capture the distinctive blameworthiness of lying, Krauss is 
 In his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius (1625,  III.I.XI.1) declares that his intent is 2
not to define lying in general, but the notion of a ‘Lye strictly taken, as it is naturally 
unlawful’ (that is, wrong or blameworthy). On his view, this ‘strict’ notion of lying 
necessarily involves the ‘Violation of a real Right’ (that is, an undefeated right to be 
told the truth).
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thus departing from the methodological conventions in the literature, 
setting a different priority for his proposal: to explain what makes 
lying prima facie wrong.  
Let us assume that Krauss has good motivations for introducing this 
new desideratum of, as we may call it, ‘moral import’. The crucial 
problem with its introduction is that the two resulting desiderata 
(moral import and descriptive accuracy) can in principle come apart 
(i.e. impose inconsistent constraints on the definition); when they do, 
a morally interesting definition will not be descriptively accurate.  
The worse-off criterion (W-O) proposed by Krauss can be helpful to 
illustrate how moral import and descriptive accuracy can come apart. 
Suppose that we share Krauss’ intuition that the distinctive moral 
wrong in lying is that the liar imposes an epistemic threat on the 
dupe, and that W-O is successful in tracking this distinctive kind of 
blameworthiness. This would not yet guarantee that a definition 
incorporating W-O is descriptively accurate. To see this, consider the 
following counterexample (inspired by Benton 2018). 
Suppose that (i) Kermit tells Elmo that (1) is false (he tells Elmo 
that there are no chocolate cookies in the jar), (ii) Kermit is 
maximally certain that (1) is true (Kermit is certain that there are in 
fact some chocolate cookies in the jar), and (iii) Kermit is aware that 
Elmo is already maximally certain that (1) is true (he knows that 
Elmo is already convinced that what he just said is true). While 
Kermit is clearly lying , he is not attempting to modify Elmo’s degree 3
of belief in (1) – he is merely providing a further (testimonial) reason 
in support of that belief. Since the expected epistemic damage (from 
the speaker’s perspective, and if the hearer trusts him) is not greater 
than 0, W-O fails to classify this as a lie. More generally, this sort of 
counterexamples (cf. Benton 2018 for further ones) shows that W-O 
is not descriptively accurate – it is too narrow, because it fails to 
provide a criterion that captures all lies.  
 Virtually every definition on the market converges on this prediction, including 3
those that require an intention to deceive. Note that although Elmo already believes 
that p is false, Kermit is attempting to deceive Elmo on most standard accounts of 
deception, as he brings about new (testimonial) evidence for that belief, contributing 
causally to Elmo’s continuing to have that inaccurate belief (cf. Chisholm and 
Feehan 1977, 144, Fuller 1976; Mahon 2007, 186-7, 189–90).
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This seems to be a problem for Krauss’s view, for he holds true (a) 
and (b), which seem to be incompatible with (c), that we have just 
proved to be true: 
(a) Lies are blameworthy in the same way 
(b) Lies are blameworthy only if [they meet the worse-off   
requirement] 
(c)  There are some lies that [do not meet the worse-off requirement] 
Since (a), (b) and (c) cannot all be true, one of these claims needs 
to be abandoned. If the desideratum of moral import needs to play 
some role in the definition of lying, we cannot abandon (a). The 
conclusion is that (b) must be abandoned. 
This points out to a more general problem: that descriptive accuracy 
cannot be sacrificed at the expenses of moral import. The schema (a-
b-c) generalises to any account of lying, once the content of the 
square brackets is replaced by an alternative requirement for the 
definition of lying. Note that claim (c) here represents the negation 
of the desideratum of descriptive accuracy, whereas condition (a) 
represents the desideratum of moral import. The schema shows that 
if descriptive accuracy is not met (that is, if (c) is true), moral 
import cannot be achieved (that is, (b) must be abandoned)– as long 
as we accept (a). Generalising, the schema shows that correctly 
characterising the moral import of lying is conditional on a 
definition’s descriptive accuracy  – whenever a definition fails to 4
 Note, however, that the ‘only if’ in (b) only captures the necessity leg of the 4
desideratum of moral import, and (c) only represents a challenge to the necessity leg 
of the definition. This because my main focus is W-O, and Krauss only claims that 
W-O is a necessary condition for lying (and for being blameworthy in the distinctive 
way that liars are). To generalize the schema so that it applies to full definitions, we 
should replace the ‘only if’ in (b) with a biconditional, and weaken (c) so as to allow 
for counterexamples to sufficiency.
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capture all lies, it also fails to capture the feature that makes lies 
blameworthy in the same distinctive way . 5
We are now in a position to determine what is wrong with 
assumptions (i) and (ii). The problem with (i), the view that the 
primary desideratum of a definition is tracking the ‘moral import’ of 
lying, is that meeting this desideratum is conditional on meeting 
‘descriptive accuracy’. As illustrated by the (a)-(b)-(c) scheme, any 
definition of lying that fails to meet descriptive accuracy also 
inevitably fails to capture the distinctive blameworthiness of this 
linguistic phenomenon. Against assumption (ii), W-O neither offers a 
good necessary condition for defining lies (since it is subject to 
counterexamples), nor it is able (for the same reason) to track their 
distinctive blameworthiness. 
To be sure, to deny these two assumptions is not to say that it is 
impossible to identify a criterion that is able to meet both desiderata. 
Clearly, there could be an alternative way to capture a morally salient 
feature that all lies have (thereby meeting ‘moral import’), and it 
may turn out that this feature is shared by all lies (thereby meeting 
‘descriptive accuracy’). But in order to determine whether such a 
criterion exists, we need to test it against both desiderata (pace to 
Krauss 2017:2,4,5). In what follows I argue that, at closer inspection, 
 One way to resist this conclusion is to argue that definitions should only aim to 5
capture a morally uniform phenomenon, that can differ significantly to our ordinary 
concept of lying. The aim of this radical ‘revisionist’ project would be to identify a 
concept that has moral significance, lying*, that may or may not coincide with our 
ordinary concept of lying. If it does coincide, the definition also provides an analysis 
of our ordinary concept. But if it does not, the definition of lying* thus obtained 
would still be illuminating: for instance, it could be useful for moral theorising, or for 
law-making purposes.  This alternative project is certainly coherent, and possibly 
worth pursuing. For my purposes, it is sufficient to point out that this project is so 
radically different from the one currently pursued by scholars working on the 
definition of lying that it cannot be regarded as a continuation of it. Authors 
engaging in the current debate explicitly aim to characterise the ordinary concept of 
lying (as it is employed by laypeople in their reasoning and talking about lying), as 
opposed to an artificial concept of lying* – within a common effort to engage in 
conceptual analysis, rather than conceptual engineering (cf. Fallis 2009, Mahon 
2015). Lack of concern for ordinary use is thus incompatible with intervening within 
this pre-existing debate (which is, quite uncontroversially, what Krauss 2017 aims to 
be doing). 
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the ‘comparative insincerity condition’ CIC can help to meet this 
challenge: it identifies a concept that coincides with our ordinary 
conception of lying, and tracks the distinctive blameworthiness of this 
phenomenon.  
2. Accuracy with Blameworthiness 
2.1. Rescuing the Comparative Insincerity Condition 
I will begin by reconsidering why CIC was rejected in the first place. 
Krauss’ criticism of CIC relied on the assumptions that we just 
rejected: that a definition of lying only needs to meet the 
desideratum of moral import, and that having W-O as a necessary 
condition is the only way to meet this desideratum. Now that we 
have established both these premises to be misguided, the 
counterexample on the ground of which Krauss rejects CIC loses its 
intuitive pull.  
In the counterexample to CIC discussed in §1, a speaker asserts that 
p while having a credence of 0.51 in p. Unless we assume that a 
definition only has to track the distinctive blameworthiness of lying, 
and adopt the worse-off requirement as the criterion to identify this 
blameworthiness (but we have seen compelling arguments not to), 
there is no strong reason to think that this assertion is either a lie or 
not a lie. Intuitions about this sort of cases are not straightforward, 
and do not warrant a preference for either CIC or W-O. But suppose 
that we are forced to give a polar verdict, and to establish that either 
this is a lie or it is not. Intuitions may vary, but the fact that the 
speaker is more confident in the truth of p than in its falsity at least 
hints at the fact that this is not a lie. CIC is able to make sense of 
both these observations. W-O, by contrast, has no resources to 
acknowledge that the example is a borderline case; nor is it able to 
acknowledge, like CIC, that the more we move from these cases of 
uncertainty (around 0.5) to certainty (0 or 1), the sharper will be our 
intuitions about whether a given utterance is a lie (cf. Marsili 
2018:176). 
At any rate, if the descriptive accuracy of a given account is best 
measured against straightforward cases, this example bears limited 
argumentative weight. Crucially, when we consider straightforward 
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cases of lying, CIC makes the right verdict in every scenario in which 
other definitions fai l . Unlike W-O, it avoids Benton’s 
counterexamples (as discussed in Benton 2018:3, fn5); and unlike the 
standard ‘belief requirement’ (B), it is able to rule in graded-belief 
lies. In sum, CIC fares better than its rivals in terms of descriptive 
accuracy. 
2.2. Blameworthiness as Norm-Violation 
Is CIC also able to track the distinctive blameworthiness of lying? I 
think that this question can be answered positively. It can be argued 
that such blameworthiness resides in a feature identified by CIC: the 
(more or less severe) violation of a norm prescribing speakers to be 
sincere. Like the standard insincerity belief requirement (B), CIC 
captures a set of acts that have a morally salient feature in common 
– they all violate a sincerity norm. But improving on (B), CIC 
acknowledges the intuitive fact that a lie can be ‘a more or less 
severe violation’ of such a norm (Marsili 2014, 2018): one thing is to 
present as true a proposition that you are certain to be false, another 
to present as true a proposition that you merely believe more likely to 
be false than true. In other words, CIC represents an improvement on 
the tradition both in terms of ‘descriptive accuracy’ and in terms of 
‘moral import’. 
Reinterpreted as characterising the wrongness of lying in terms of 
norm-violation, CIC places itself in a ‘classic’ tradition in the 
literature on the morality of lying. What is wrong with lying is here 
understood in deontological terms – there is a rule that lying 
infringes, and its blameworthiness is a function of such infringement. 
By contrast, Krauss’ account identifies the blameworthiness of lying 
in terms of its expected harmful consequences, falling rather under a 
consequentialist tradition. 
This might be seen as a sign that there is something counterintuitive 
about CIC. Prominent proponents of deontological accounts like 
Augustine and Kant also subscribed to ‘absolutism’ about lying: the 
view, often judged to be counterintuitive, that the impermissibility of 
lying is exceptionless (cf. Augustine [DM]; [CM], Kant [G]; [LE]; 
[RL]). But accepting a deontological story about the wrongness of 
lying does not commit one to absolutism. One can still maintain that 
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while all lying is wrong qua violation of a sincerity norm, any given 
act of lying can be nonetheless overall morally permissible; to put it 
in slightly different terms, a plausible version of this view is that lying 
is prima facie wrong (cf. Ross 1930). On this view, the fact that you 
say something you believe more likely to be false than true is a 
defeasible reason to classify your action as morally reprehensible. 
Furthermore, saying that lying is wrong in virtue of the violation of a 
sincerity norm does not entail that the wrongness of lying is 
exhausted by such violation. This view allows for other criteria of 
moral evaluation to be salient when we make moral judgments about 
lying (cf. Stokke 2017). For instance, the expected deceptiveness of a 
lie will typically be a salient dimension of evaluation, as hardly 
anyone denies that lying typically involves intended deception. 
3.3 A Reconciliation: Lies and Deception  
We can conclude by devising a partial reconciliation between Marsili’s 
and Krauss’ view. When it comes to a descriptively accurate 
definition of lying, lying is best understood as the act of asserting 
something insincerely, where insincerity is captured by CIC. All lies 
are prima facie wrong qua lies, to the extent (captured by CIC) that 
they all violate a norm of sincerity– the greater the violation, the 
more severe the blameworthiness that arises from such violation. 
Furthermore, most lies are prima facie wrong qua attempts to 
deceive; arguably, this kind of blameworthiness is a function of the 
extent to which they meet W-O: the greater the epistemic risk they 
impose on the hearer, the greater the blameworthiness of the attempt 
to deceive . This gives us a two-fold account of the blameworthiness 6
of lying: in terms of the credences they necessarily misrepresent, and 
of the inaccurate credences they typically aim to induce.  
 While there is growing consensus in the literature that lying does not necessarily 6
involve an intent to deceive, some philosophers still subscribe to this view (e.g. 
Faulkner 2007; Lackey 2013). If they are right, then all lies are also blameworthy qua 
attempts to deceive. In either case, in light of Benton’s (2018) counterexamples, W-
O still needs to be refined to successfully track the blameworthiness of each and 
every act of attempted deception.
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Conclusions 
This article has proposed a solution to three fundamental questions 
in the philosophy of lying: (i) establishing the primary desiderata of a 
definition lying, (ii) defining what lying is, and (iii) characterising its 
distinctive blameworthiness. 
In relation to the first issue, I argued (against Krauss and a tradition 
that traces back to Grotius) that offering a definition of lying and 
characterising its moral import are two independent tasks, and that 
achieving the latter is conditional on achieving the former. When it 
comes to evaluating whether a definition of lying is correct, we 
should thus look at a definition’s descriptive accuracy rather than its 
ability to explain the distinctive way in which lies are blameworthy, 
since only by meeting the former desideratum we can meet the latter. 
These considerations have important consequences for the ongoing 
philosophical debate about what lying is, and what makes it 
blameworthy. Once Krauss’ mistaken assumptions about the 
desiderata for the definitions of lying are abandoned, it becomes clear 
that his critique of the ‘comparative insincerity condition’  is 
misguided.  This in turn means that we can after all offer a fine-
grained definition of lying that accounts for partial beliefs – for which 
no options are otherwise left available, given that neither Krauss’ 
‘worse-off requirement’ nor the traditional ‘belief requirement’ are 
able to draw the right distinctions about graded-belief lies. 
Finally, I have argued that CIC has the resources to track the 
distinctive blameworthiness of lying, it in terms of a (more or less 
severe) violation of a sincerity norm. Endorsing this explanation of 
the moral import of lying is compatible with acknowledging that also 
W-O captures a morally salient dimension of blameworthiness: the 
(higher or lower) epistemic damage that the liar typically aims to 
impose on the dupe. In advancing this partial reconciliation between 
two competing views about graded-belief lies, this paper has offered 
a novel, bipartite characterisation of lying and its distinctive 
blameworthiness: in terms of the norms that it necessarily violates, 
and in terms of the epistemic risks that it typically imposes on the 
hearer. 
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